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CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION AND THE 
PRIVACIES OF LIFE: THE IMPACT OF 
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 
Trevor Moore* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cell phones have become an “important feature of human 
anatomy,”1 and Americans should not forfeit their Fourth Amendment 
rights simply for owning one. The Framers’ central aim in drafting the 
Fourth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has made clear, was to 
secure “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power,’”2 which 
includes placing “obstacles in the way of a too permeating police 
surveillance.”3 However, as technology has advanced, Fourth 
Amendment protections have become weaker and weaker. 
For example, law enforcement may now use cell phones and cell-
site location information (CSLI) to discover an individual’s location.4 
Prior to June 22, 2018, law enforcement could contact a cell phone 
service provider, such as Verizon, T-Mobile, or Sprint, and obtain 
CSLI by demonstrating to a judge that the “records sought ‘[were] 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”5 This 
standard is extremely easy to meet and “falls well short of the probable 
cause required for a warrant.”6 
This type of surveillance is “too permeating,”7 and without 
change, Americans will be left “at the mercy of advancing 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Criminal Justice, 
California State University, Chico, May 2012. Thank you to the editors and staff of the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work in editing this Note. In addition, thank you to my 
family for the constant love and support. 
 1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
 2. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 3. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 4. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 
16, Rios v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2701 (2018) (No. 16-7314). 
 5. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)). 
 6. Id. at 2221. 
 7. Id. at 2214 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595). 
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technology.”8 Fortunately, in Carpenter v. United States,9 the 
Supreme Court made the requirements to obtain CSLI more 
stringent.10 However, while this modification was a big step in the 
right direction, it was not enough. 
This Note explains the impact Carpenter had on determining 
whether individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
records of their physical movements captured through real-time CSLI. 
Further, this Note proposes that real-time CSLI, just like historical 
CSLI, should be protected by the Fourth Amendment and that a 
warrant should be required before law enforcement may obtain it. 
Part II of this Note describes how cell phones operate, what CSLI 
is, and how CSLI is collected. Part III analyzes the development of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through Carpenter. Part IV 
explains the current state of the law and demonstrates, through three 
case illustrations, that lower courts are split on how to interpret the 
Carpenter decision. Part V sets out the proper way of interpreting 
Carpenter and how states can expedite the process of properly 
protecting their citizens. Lastly, Part VI concludes that the majority of 
lower courts are moving in the correct direction and that there is hope 
in the near future that all citizens will be properly protected against 
warrantless searches of their real-time CSLI. 
II.  CELL PHONES AND CELL-SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
A.  The Ubiquitous Use of Cell Phones 
There are 421.7 million wireless devices in the United States—
nearly 1.3 devices for every person in the country.11 In 2008, 77 
percent of Americans owned a cell phone.12 In 2019, it has risen to a 
staggering 96 percent, with 81 percent owning smartphones.13 In 
addition, Americans are using their cell phones at unprecedented rates. 
Data usage is up over 73 times what it was in 2010 and continues to 
increase.14 For example, from 2017 to 2018, there was an 82 percent 
 
 8. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001)). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 10. See id. at 2223. 
 11. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA (June 20, 2019), https://www.ctia.org/news/2019-
annual-survey-highlights. 
 12. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, supra note 11. 
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increase in mobile data use, which is “more data than was used in the 
first six and a half years of this decade—combined.”15 
Cell phones are a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life.”16 Not 
only does almost everyone own a cell phone, but people use them all 
day long, carry them everywhere they go, and rarely, if ever, turn them 
off. For example, 94 percent of smartphone owners “frequently” carry 
their phones,17 79 percent have their phones on or nearby for 22 hours 
a day,18 and 82 percent never turn their phones off.19 
B.  How Cell Phones and CSLI Function 
When cell phones are turned on, they continuously scan the 
environment in search of the best signal, which comes from the closest 
cell site.20 Each time a cell phone “connects to a cell site, it generates 
a time-stamped record known as [CSLI].”21 This information contains 
the time when the user connected to the site as well as the location of 
the site itself.22 The record reveals “where the phone—and by proxy, 
its owner—is or has been,” through “triangulating its precise location 
based on which cell sites receive” transmissions.23 
Modern phones, such as smartphones, connect with cell sites 
“several times a minute,”24 “but can connect as frequently as every 
seven seconds.”25 When smartphones connect to cell sites, they  
“generate location data even in the absence of any user interaction with 
the phone.”26 This occurs because smartphones have applications 
which continuously “run in the background,” such as email 
applications.27 Even turning off the location-privacy settings on the 
phone will not affect the service provider’s ability to access CSLI.28 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
 17. LEE RAINIE & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON MOBILE 
ETIQUETTE 2 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/chapter-1-always- 
on-connectivity. 
 18. Allison Stadd, 79% of People 18-44 Have Their Smartphones with Them 22 Hours a Day, 
ADWEEK (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://www.adweek.com/digital/smartphones. 
 19. RAINIE & ZICKUHR, supra note 17. 
 20. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16. 
 23. Id. at 12, 16. 
 24. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 25. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
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Thus, the only way phone users can protect their location data is to 
completely shut off their phones.29 
The accuracy of the location information “depends on the size of 
the geographic area covered by the cell site.”30 The greater the 
concentration of cell sites, the more accurate the location data will 
be.31 To handle the massive increase in cell phone usage, service 
providers are building more and more cell sites, which in turn creates 
more accurate CSLI.32 
Generally, cell sites are mounted on towers.33 However, more 
recently, they have been placed on “light posts, flagpoles, church 
steeples, [and] the sides of buildings.”34 As of 2018, there are 349,344 
cell sites in the United States,35 totaling more than a 52 percent growth 
over the last decade.36 This substantial growth is not coming to an end. 
Analysts project that another 800,000 cell sites will be built in the next 
few years.37 Even with the current 349,344 cell sites, CSLI is 
approaching GPS-level precision.38 This means that CSLI can 
pinpoint a phone’s location within a “few feet of its position,” and will 
only become more accurate as more cell sites are created.39 
Service providers collect and retain CSLI for several reasons and 
for various periods of time. For example, in its privacy statement, T-
Mobile explains that: 
[i]f your mobile device is turned on, our network is collecting 
data about the device location. We may use, provide access 
to, or disclose this network location data without your 
approval to provide and support our services, including to 
route wireless communications, operate and improve our 
 
 29. RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF 
LAW, CELLPHONES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: HOW THE GOVERNMENT 
IS COLLECTING AND USING YOUR LOCATION DATA 2 (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Cell_Surveillance_Privacy.pdf 
(“[S]hort of turning off one’s phone, it is nearly impossible to prevent the transmission of location 
data.”). 
 30. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 31. Id. at 2211–12. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2211. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 2019 Annual Survey Highlights, supra note 11. 
 36. 2018 Annual Survey Highlights, CTIA (July 10, 2018), https://www.ctia.org/news/the-
state-of-wireless-2018. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. 
 39. Id. at 1. 
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network and business, detect and prevent fraud, provide 
emergency responders information about how to find you 
when you call 911, or as required by law or emergency.40 
Service providers will retain this data anywhere from three months to 
seven years.41 
C.  How Law Enforcement Uses CSLI 
Law enforcement may obtain CSLI from service providers if it 
satisfies certain requirements. As mentioned above, prior to 
Carpenter, law enforcement could obtain CSLI with a court order 
under the Stored Communications Act.42 The Stored Communications 
Act “permits the Government to compel the disclosure of certain 
telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the 
records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.’”43 This “showing falls well short of the probable cause 
required for a warrant” and needed a change.44 The Supreme Court, in 
Carpenter, attempted to make that change. However, it was not 
enough. The reason why the change was insufficient will be explained 
in Parts IV and V of this Note. 
There are two types of CSLI which law enforcement may collect: 
“historical” CSLI and “real-time” CSLI.45 Historical CSLI is location 
information collected by a service provider “in the past,” or, in other 
words, “prior to the time of a data request.”46 This includes data that 
was collected “one day ago, one month ago, one year ago or 
beyond.”47 Law enforcement uses historical CSLI “to look back 
through service provider records to determine a suspect’s location at a 
given point in the past.”48 This allows law enforcement to “prove that 
 
 40. Privacy Policy, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/privacy-
policy (last updated Dec. 21, 2019). 
 41. Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods, PROF. DIGITAL FORENSIC CONSULTING: 
BLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://prodigital4n6.com/cellular-provider-record-retention-periods (listing 
data retention periods for five different service providers). 
 42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 43. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)). 
 44. Id. at 2221. 
 45. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
 46. Cell Site Location Information: What Is It?, ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUND.: CRIM. 
DEFENDER TOOLKIT, https://www.eff.org/criminaldefender/cell-site-location (last visited Nov. 15, 
2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Andrews, 134 A.3d at 328 n.3. 
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a defendant was in the area where a crime of which he is accused 
occurred.”49 
Real-time CSLI is “current or future location information . . . that 
live-tracks a cell phone’s location at any given moment.”50 Law 
enforcement uses real-time CSLI “to track the whereabouts and 
movements of a suspect by using the cell phone as a tracking 
device.”51 It is commonly used to assist law enforcement in locating a 
suspect to make an arrest.52 
There are two main methods by which law enforcement collect 
historical CSLI. First, and most commonly, law enforcement will 
request past location information from a service provider for 
particular cell phone numbers.53 The other method, called “cell tower 
dumps,” is where law enforcement agencies “request information 
about every device connected to a single tower during a particular 
interval, potentially netting historical location information from 
thousands of phones.”54 
There are also two main methods in which law enforcement 
collects real-time CSLI. The first method, called “pinging,” is where 
law enforcement requests that service providers “‘ping’ phones to 
force them into revealing their location.”55 Pinging “relies on 
Enhanced 911 (E911) data, which allows law enforcement to pinpoint 
the location of cell phones that have placed 911 calls.”56 However, the 
“provider can also make a reverse 911 call, allowing the police to 
invisibly track a target’s cell phone in real time.”57 The second 
method, the use of “cell-site simulators” or “Stingrays,” effectively 
allows law enforcement to “circumvent the service provider and gain 
direct access to real-time” CSLI.58 The device “‘masquerades as a cell 
tower, tricking all nearby cell phones to connect to itself’ rather than 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Cell Site Location Information: What Is It?, supra note 46. 
 51. Andrews, 134 A.3d at 328 n.3. 
 52. Primer from Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Cell Phone Location Tracking  (June 
7, 2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-
Primer_Final.pdf. 
 53. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; Cellular Provider Record Retention Periods, supra note 41. 
 56. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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to a legitimate tower.”59 When used, “whether by hand, from within a 
patrol car, or attached to a plane,” the device gathers the real-time 
CSLI “of all phones within range.”60 
Law enforcement agencies frequently collect CSLI. For example, 
in 2018, T-Mobile received 104,221 requests for CSLI.61 In particular, 
it received 70,224 historical requests, 6,184 tower dump requests, and 
27,813 real-time requests.62 Additionally, in just the first half of 
2019,63 AT&T received 47,110 requests for CSLI.64 In particular, it 
received 37,144 historical requests, 1,497 tower dump requests, and 
8,469 real-time requests.65 
III.  EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW IMPACTING CSLI 
 The distinction between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI has 
significant legal ramifications when it comes to Fourth Amendment 
protection. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”66 However, courts have 
struggled with determining whether CSLI is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because CSLI does “not fit neatly under existing [Fourth 
Amendment] precedents.”67 
In legal terms, CSLI is defined as “personal location information 
maintained by a third party.”68 The “personal location information,” 
refers to the time-stamped record generated each time the cell phone 
connects to a cell site, and the “third party” refers to a cell-phone 
provider, such as Verizon, T-Mobile, or Sprint.69 
 
 59. Id. (quoting George Joseph, Cellphone Spy Tools Have Flooded Local Police 
Departments, CITYLAB (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/cellphone-spy-
tools-have-flooded-local-police-departments/512543/).  
 60. Id. 
 61. T-MOBILE U.S., TRANSPARENCY REPORT FOR 2018 6 (2018), https://www.t-
mobile.com/content/t-mobile/corporate/news/media-library/details/document.html/content/dam/t-
mobile/corporate/media-library/public/documents/TransparencyReport2018.pdf?a=b. 
 62. Id. 
 63. From January to June 2019. See AT&T INTELLECTUAL PROP., AUGUST 2019 
TRANSPARENCY REPORT 4 (2019), https://about.att.com/ecms/dam/csr/2019/library/ATT_ 
English_TransparencyReport_Aug%202019.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 67. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 2211–12. 
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This definition of CSLI creates an issue for the courts because 
CSLI falls between “two lines of cases.”70 One line of cases holds a 
person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their 
physical movements.”71 The second line of cases abides by the “third-
party” doctrine, which states that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”72 
Various courts around the country have struggled to determine 
what precedent controls the “unique nature” of CSLI.73 However, in 
2018, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address this question. 
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held “that an individual 
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his 
physical movements as captured through [historical] CSLI,” and that 
“accessing seven days of CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment 
search.”74 However, the Court did not express whether this protection 
applie[d] to real-time CSLI and “whether there is a limited period for 
which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free 
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”75 
This extremely narrow holding effectively “raise[d] more 
questions than it answer[ed].”76 Most importantly, Carpenter left it to 
the lower courts to interpret whether the Fourth Amendment protects 
real-time CSLI and whether there is a limited time for which either 
type of CSLI may be obtained without a warrant.77 Several lower 
courts have addressed these questions; however, there are major splits 
on when, if ever, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their real-time CSLI.78 
 
 70. Id. at 2214–15. 
 71. Id. at 2215, 2217. 
 72. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)); see also Sims v. 
State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749 (2019) (“To 
resolve the expectation-of-privacy issue in this case, we must consider two different lines of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 73. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 74. Id. at 2217, 2217 n.3. 
 75. Id. at 2217 n.3. 
 76. Vanessa Blum, What’s Next for Digital Privacy? New Clashes over the Fourth 
Amendment, LAW.COM: RECORDER (Mar. 7, 2019, 4:36 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/ 
2019/03/07/whats-next-for-digital-privacy-new-clashes-over-the-fourth-amendment. 
 77. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3, 2220. 
 78. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 943, 947, 950 n.33 (2019) (organizing lower courts’ interpretations of Carpenter into four 
differing models). 
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When the opportunity again arises for the Supreme Court to 
address whether real-time CSLI is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court should hold that individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their real-time CSLI and that a warrant 
should be required to access it. A brief background of the Fourth 
Amendment and its evolution towards Carpenter is helpful in 
understanding why this should be so. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment and Katz v. United States 
As mentioned above, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”79 Traditionally, the 
Fourth Amendment was “tied to common-law trespass,” where 
unreasonable searches consisted of “physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area,” such as the home.80 However, in Katz 
v. United States,81 the Supreme Court drastically expanded the 
conception of the Fourth Amendment to protect an individual’s 
“reasonable expectation” of privacy rather than mere “places.”82 
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Katz, “laid the groundwork for the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.”83 There, law enforcement, 
without a warrant, attached an eavesdropping device to the top of a 
public telephone booth to listen to and record the defendant’s 
conversation.84 The prosecution later used this conversation as 
evidence at trial.85 The defendant argued that the device constituted a 
search and violated the Fourth Amendment because it invaded the 
privacy he “justifiably relied” on when using the phone booth.86 The 
government argued the device did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because it “involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth.”87 
The Court sided with the defendant and famously stated that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”88 This meant that 
the Fourth Amendment was not only violated when there was a 
 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 80. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added). 
 81. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 82. Id. at 351. 
 83. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2014). 
 84. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 353. 
 87. Id. at 352. 
 88. Id. at 351. 
(10) 53.3_MOORE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2020  10:55 PM 
722 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:713 
“physical intrusion” of a protected area.89 Instead, the Fourth 
Amendment was also violated when the defendant’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” was invaded.90 
Justice Harlan, in a concurrence, fleshed out what the Supreme 
Court has subsequently adopted as the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test.91 The test consists of a two-part inquiry: (1) has the 
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) “is 
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?“92 
There is no definitive list as to what expectations of privacy are 
“reasonable.” However, cases following Katz, such as United States v. 
Knotts93 and United States v. Jones,94 where law enforcement used 
tracking devices to follow the defendants’ vehicles, demonstrate how 
the Supreme Court has applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test to a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical 
location and movements.95 
B.  An Individual’s Expectation of Privacy in His or Her 
Physical Location and Movements 
1.  United States v. Knotts 
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Knotts, held that a law 
enforcement “beeper” did not violate the defendant’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”96 There, law enforcement believed the 
defendant was purchasing chloroform to produce illegal drugs.97 Then, 
without a warrant, law enforcement placed a beeper—a tracking 
device—inside a chloroform container that was later sold to the 
 
 89. Id. at 352–53. 
 90. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 91. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2014); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 406 (2012) (stating that in “later cases” the Supreme Court has “applied the analysis of Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence . . . which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a 
person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’”). 
 92. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[F]irst that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) 
(reiterating the test as “first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable?”). 
 93. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 94. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 95. See id. at 404; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 96. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 97. Id. at 278. 
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defendant.98 Relying on the beeper’s signal to keep the vehicle in view, 
law enforcement followed the defendant’s vehicle carrying the 
chloroform from its place of purchase to the defendant’s cabin.99 Law 
enforcement then secured a search warrant for the cabin and 
discovered it was being used as a drug laboratory.100 
The defendant argued the use of the beeper was prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment because it violated his “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”101 The Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test and held the beeper did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.102 It stated that a “person traveling in an automobile on 
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another” because the movements are 
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wants to look.”103 
However, the Court made clear that this was not a blanket rule for 
all future electronic-type tracking in public areas.104 It explained that 
“different constitutional principles may be applicable” to “twenty-four 
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.”105 
2.  United States v. Jones 
In 2012, the Supreme Court, in Jones, examined the “more 
sophisticated surveillance . . . envisioned in Knotts and found that 
different principles did indeed apply.”106 There, law enforcement 
believed the defendant was trafficking narcotics and, without a 
warrant, installed a tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle.107 Law 
enforcement tracked the defendant for twenty-eight days and found he 
was working at a narcotics stash house.108 The defendant argued the 
placing of the tracking device on his vehicle violated the Fourth 
Amendment.109 
 
 98. Id. at 278–79. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 279. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. at 280–81, 285. 
 103. Id. at 281–82. 
 104. See id. at 283–84. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018); see United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 409–13 (2012). 
 107. Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03. 
 108. Id. at 403–04. 
 109. See id. at 403. 
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The Supreme Court agreed.110 However, instead of applying the 
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Court based its 
decision on the traditional “common-law trespass” approach.111 It held 
the Fourth Amendment was violated because law enforcement 
physically intruded on the defendant’s “personal property to gather 
information,” and therefore it was not necessary to apply the Katz 
test.112 
However, in the concurrences, five Justices agreed that, if the 
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test was applied, “longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
the expectation of privacy—regardless whether those movements 
were disclosed to the public at large.”113 For example, the Jones 
Justices noted that the privacy concerns would be raised by conducting 
GPS tracking of the defendant’s cell phone.114 
Both Knotts and Jones recognized that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical movements.115 
However, as technology has advanced, this expectation of privacy has 
collided with the third-party doctrine.116 To understand this conflict, it 
is helpful to understand the principles on which the third-party 
doctrine was formed. 
C.  The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine is the notion that “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”117 However, this doctrine is not as stringent as it 
sounds. The Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine in United 
States v. Miller118 and Smith v. Maryland,119 and in doing so, the Court 
 
 110. Id. at 404. 
 111. Id. at 404–05. 
 112. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 113. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2012) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 
(Alito, J., concurring)). 
 114. Jones, 565 U.S. at 426, 428 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 115. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215, 2217 (analyzing Knotts and Jones decisions). 
 116. See id. at 2214 (explaining that “personal location information maintained by a third party 
does not fit neatly under existing precedents” but “lie[s] at the intersection of two lines of cases”). 
 117. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 118. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 119. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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did not “rely solely on the act of sharing,” but rather, it considered “the 
nature of the particular documents sought.”120 
1.  United States v. Miller 
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Miller, held the defendant had no 
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily conveyed to a 
bank.121 There, the defendant was under investigation for tax fraud, 
and law enforcement used an allegedly defective subpoena to obtain 
his bank records.122 The defendant argued that obtaining his records 
with a defective subpoena violated his Fourth Amendment rights.123 
However, the Court disagreed and held the defendant had “no 
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in” the records.124 
The Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test and laid out two reasons why the defendant had no expectation of 
privacy.125 First, the Court looked to the “nature of the [records].”126 
It determined the records were not “private papers,” but rather non-
confidential “negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions.”127 Second, the Court explained the records were 
“voluntarily conveyed to the banks . . . in the ordinary course of 
business,” and that the “Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party”128 because “(w)hat 
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”129 The Court concluded the defendant, by 
“revealing his affairs to another,” had taken a risk  that the information 
would be conveyed “to the Government.”130 
2.  Smith v. Maryland 
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Smith, held the defendant had no 
expectation of privacy in his records of dialed telephone numbers 
 
 120. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (considering 
the nature of the information collected by the pen register). 
 121. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
 122. Id. at 436. 
 123. Id. at 437. 
 124. Id. at 442. 
 125. Id. at 442–43. 
 126. Id. at 442. 
 127. Id. at 440–42. 
 128. Id. at 442–43. 
 129. Id. at 442 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 130. Id. at 443. 
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voluntarily conveyed to a telephone company.131 There, the defendant 
was a suspect in a robbery.132 Law enforcement, without a warrant, 
had a pen register133 installed on the defendant’s home phone in order 
to record the numbers he dialed.134 These records led to the 
defendant’s eventual arrest and conviction.135 The defendant argued 
the warrantless pen register violated his “legitimate expectation of 
privacy” in the “numbers he dialed on his phone.”136 However, the 
Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and 
rejected the defendant’s argument.137 
Similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, the “nature” of 
the records was essential in the Court’s decision.138 The Court doubted 
that telephone users have “any [subjective] expectation of privacy 
regarding the numbers they dial” because of the very “limited 
capabilities” of pen registers.139 The Court emphasized that pen 
registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have been 
dialed.”140 In addition, the Court concluded, the “expectation [was] not 
‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’”141 because 
the defendant “voluntarily conveyed” the dialed numbers and 
“assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to police.”142 
The third-party doctrine receives more and more criticism as 
technology advances. In the 1970s, when Miller and Smith were 
decided, it made sense that records with very “limited capabilities,” 
such as records of dialed numbers and bank records, did not have 
protection when voluntarily conveyed to a third-party.143 But now, the 
“nature” of the information being conveyed is much more detailed and 
intimate. Law enforcement no longer seizes records of dialed 
 
 131. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 132. Id. at 737. 
 133. To be clear, “pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications . . . ‘[t]hey 
disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed.’” Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. 
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). 
 134. Id. at 737. 
 135. Id. at 737–38. 
 136. Id. at 742. 
 137. See id. at 740, 745. 
 138. See id. at 741–42. 
 139. Id. at 742. 
 140. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 142. Id. at 745. 
 143. See id. at 744–45. 
(10) 53.3_MOORE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2020  10:55 PM 
2020] THE IMPACT OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 727 
numbers, but instead, seizes an individual’s exact location, within a 
few feet. 
The expectation of privacy in an individual’s physical location 
and movements, delineated in Knotts and Jones, has collided with the 
third-party doctrine of Miller and Smith. Which doctrine gives way? 
The Supreme Court confronted this conflict in Carpenter and 
attempted to demonstrate how these principles interact. However, the 
Court’s resolution ended up “rais[ing] more questions than it 
answer[ed].”144 
D.  Carpenter v. United States 
On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of 
Carpenter v. United States, held that “accessing seven days of 
[historical] CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment search.”145 There, 
law enforcement arrested four men suspected of committing a string 
of armed robberies.146 One of these men confessed and gave law 
enforcement the phone numbers of other alleged accomplices, 
including the cell phone number of the defendant, Timothy 
Carpenter.147 Shortly after, law enforcement obtained a court order 
under the Stored Communications Act to obtain seven days of 
Carpenter’s historical CSLI from the service provider Sprint.148 
The prosecution used the seven days of historical CSLI at trial to 
show that Carpenter’s phone was “near four of the charged robberies” 
at the time those robberies occurred.149 This evidence led to the 
eventual conviction of Carpenter and a prison sentence of over one 
hundred years.150 
Carpenter appealed the conviction to the Sixth Circuit and argued 
that law enforcement’s seizure of the historical CSLI “violated the 
Fourth Amendment because [it] had been obtained without a warrant 
 
 144. Blum, supra note 76. 
 145. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018). 
 146. Id. at 2212. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. The Stored Communications Act allows the government to obtain CSLI by simply 
showing that the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation,” which is a much 
lower showing than the probable cause required for a warrant. Id. at 2221 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d) (2012)). 
 149. Id. at 2213. 
 150. Id. 
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supported by probable cause.”151 The Sixth Circuit, citing Smith,152 
and applying the third-party doctrine, held that Carpenter “lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information . . . 
because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.”153 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and was faced with determining 
whether “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”154 
As explained in Part III of this Note, the Carpenter Court had 
difficulties resolving this issue because CSLI “does not fit neatly 
under existing precedent” but instead “lie[s] at the intersection of two 
lines of cases.”155 The first set being Knotts and Jones, which 
addressed a “person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location 
and movements,” and the second set being Miller and Smith, which 
addressed the third-party doctrine.156 The Carpenter Court explained 
that collection of CSLI has “many of the qualities of the GPS 
monitoring . . . considered in Jones.”157 However, it also “implicates 
the third-party principle of Smith and Miller” because “the individual 
continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier.”158 
The collision of these two doctrines required the Court to address 
a novel issue. Which doctrine gives way? Does the fact CSLI is 
“shared” and “held” by a third party trump an individual’s expectation 
of privacy in his or her physical location and movements? The Court 
did not think so. It “decline[d] to extend” the third-party doctrine to 
the collection of historical CSLI and held that “an individual maintains 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical 
movements.”159 The Court organized its analysis into two parts. First, 
the Court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. 
Second, the Court addressed whether the third-party doctrine extends 
to CSLI. 
 
 151. Id. at 2212. 
 152. See supra Part III (discussing the third-party doctrine). 
 153. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added) (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s holding). 
 154. Id. at 2217. 
 155. Id. at 2214. 
 156. Id. at 2215–16. 
 157. Id. at 2216. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 2217. 
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1.  Application of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test 
In applying the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the 
Court looked to Jones. It found that Jones, rather than Knotts, 
controlled because Knotts dealt with a less sophisticated form of 
surveillance distinguishable from CSLI.160 It began by acknowledging 
that a majority of the Supreme Court, in both Jones and Knotts, have 
“already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”161 However, the 
Carpenter Court took this expectation much further. 
The Court explained that CSLI “hold[s] for many Americans the 
‘privacies of life.’”162 It stated that CSLI is an “all-encompassing 
record” which “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, 
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 
‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.’”163 It reasoned that collection of CSLI “present[s] even 
greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring . . . in Jones.”164 
This was because cell phones are a “feature of human anatomy,” and 
unlike the GPS monitoring of a vehicle in Jones, individuals 
“regularly” and “compulsively” bring their cell phones with them 
everywhere.165 This allows law enforcement to monitor far beyond 
“public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, 
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”166 
The Court concluded that, with CSLI, law enforcement had 
“access to a category of information otherwise unknowable”; it “can 
now travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts,” and the 
only restraint is the length of time the data is retained by wireless 
carriers.167 Accordingly, the Court held that it was reasonable for 
society to expect that law enforcement will not “catalogue every single 
 
 160. See id. at 2218. (explaining that “[u]nlike the bugged container in Knotts . . . a cell phone 
. . . tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner”). 
 161. Id. at 2217. 
 162. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)). 
 163. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)).  
 164. Id. at 2218. 
 165. Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (“[W]ireless carriers . . . currently maintain records for up to five years.”). 
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movement” of an individual,168 and that allowing law enforcement to 
access CSLI “contravenes that expectation.”169 
2.  Application of the Third-Party Doctrine 
Next, the Court moved to the second part of its analysis: 
application of the third-party doctrine. In doing so, the Court 
addressed the two rationales behind the third-party doctrine: “the 
nature of the particular documents”170 and “voluntary exposure.”171 
The Court began by addressing the “nature of the particular 
documents.”172 The government argued that the third-party doctrine 
should be applied to CSLI because, like the dialed numbers and bank 
records in Smith and Miller, CSLI are “‘business records’ created and 
maintained by the wireless carriers.”173 However, the Court disagreed 
because the government failed to acknowledge the “seismic shifts”174 
in surveillance technology that allowed law enforcement to track “not 
only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short 
period but for years and years.”175 
Furthermore, the Court distinguished CSLI from the “limited 
types of personal information” sought in Smith and Miller.176 It found 
there was a “world of difference” between dialed numbers and bank 
records, and the “exhaustive chronicle of location information 
casually collected by wireless carriers.”177 While dialed numbers and 
bank records “reveal little in the way of ‘identifying information,’”178 
CSLI has “no comparable limitations on [its] revealing nature.”179 
CSLI discloses a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence 
compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”180 Thus, the 
Court concluded that due to the “nature” of CSLI, the government 
 
 168. Id. at 2217; see Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v. 
United States, LAWFARE: BLOG (June 22, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
summary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states. 
 169. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 170. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)). 
 171. Id. at 2220. 
 172. Id. at 2219. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 2220. 
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“[was] not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party 
doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category 
of information.”181 
Next, the Court moved to the second rationale underlying the 
third-party doctrine: “voluntary exposure.”182 The Court explained 
that CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the 
term.”183 CSLI is generated by “[v]irtually any activity on the phone,” 
including “incoming calls, texts, or e-mails,” and therefore can be 
generated “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up.”184 Furthermore, cell phones are “‘such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to 
participation in modern society.”185 Thus, the Court concluded that 
“there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data,”186 
and “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the 
risk’” of sharing the data.187 Consequently, the Court declined to 
extend the third-party doctrine to the collection of historical CSLI.188 
3.  The Supreme Court’s Holding 
Accordingly, the Court held that “an individual maintains a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical 
movements as captured through CSLI.”189 However, in controversial 
fashion, the Court made clear its decision was “a narrow one.”190 The 
Court stated that its holding did not apply to “real-time CSLI” and did 
not decide whether there was a limited period for which law 
enforcement may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI without a 
warrant.191 It stated that it was “sufficient for our purposes . . . to hold 
that accessing seven days of CSLI constitute[d] a Fourth Amendment 
search.”192 
 
 181. Id. at 2219. 
 182. Id. at 2220. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. at 2217. 
 190. Id. at 2220. 
 191. See id. (emphasis added). 
 192. Id. at 2217 n.3 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, the Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to 
interpret whether individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their real-time CSLI and whether accessing less than seven 
days of CSLI constitutes a search.193 
IV.  INTERPRETATIONS OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 
Several lower courts have addressed whether the protections of 
Carpenter extend to real-time CSLI and whether accessing less than 
seven days of CSLI constitutes a search. However, the lower courts 
are split on when, if ever, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in their real-time CSLI.194 There are three lower court 
decisions that demonstrate the wide-ranging interpretations of 
Carpenter: Andres v. State,195 Sims v. State,196 and Commonwealth v. 
Almonor.197 
In Andres, the Supreme Court of Florida held the Carpenter 
ruling did not apply to real-time CSLI.198 In Sims, the Texas Criminal 
Appeals Court held an individual did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in three hours of real-time CSLI.199 And, in 
Almonor, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that collection of 
any CSLI intruded on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.200 
A.  Andres v. State 
In September 2018, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Andres 
and found the Carpenter holding inapplicable because Florida law 
enforcement had used real-time CSLI to locate the defendant.201 
 
 193. See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 n.8 (Mass. 2019) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court “expressly avoided” addressing the protection of real-time CSLI). 
 194. See Rozenshtein, supra note 78, at 950–51. 
 195. 254 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 2018). 
 196. 569 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749 (2019). 
 197. 120 N.E.3d 1183 (Mass. 2019). 
 198. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 297 n.7. 
 199. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 646. 
 200. See Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1195–96; see also Jennifer Lynch, Massachusetts Court 
Blocks Warrantless Access to Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/massachusetts-court-blocks-
warrantless-access-real-time-cell-phone-location-data (explaining that the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts held that “police access to real-time cell phone location data—whether it comes 
from a phone company or from technology like a cell site simulator—intrudes on a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
 201. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 297 n.7; see also Peter A. Crusco, ‘Carpenter’ Squared: Review and 
Reconcile State Court Cases Impacted by Landmark SCOTUS Decision, LAW.COM: N.Y.L.J. 
(Apr. 22, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/22/carpenter-
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There, the defendant was a suspect in a murder case, and law 
enforcement obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s body, home, 
and van.202 Law enforcement then used a cell-site simulator, or 
Stingray, to locate the defendant and execute the warrant.203 Upon 
finding and arresting the defendant, law enforcement took a DNA 
sample as well as photographs of his body, which led to the 
defendant’s eventual conviction.204 
The defendant attempted to suppress this evidence by arguing that 
an additional “probable cause warrant was required” to use the cell-
site simulator.205 The court rejected the argument. It held that the 
evidence obtained—the DNA and photographs—was “well within the 
scope of the [original] warrant” and an additional warrant was not 
needed.206 In coming to this decision, the court explicitly stated that 
the Carpenter “holding [was] not applicable . . . [because] officers 
used real-time cell-site location information.”207 
B.  Sims v. State 
In January 2019, the Texas Criminal Appeals Court decided Sims 
and held that three hours of real-time CSLI tracking did not intrude on 
the legitimate expectation of privacy afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment.208 The defendant, a murder suspect, was identified 
driving the victim’s vehicle and using the victim’s credit cards.209 The 
officer who made this discovery went back to his office to obtain a 
warrant to ping the defendant’s cell phone.210 However, upon arrival, 
he discovered that another officer had already done so without a proper 
warrant.211 The warrantless pinging allowed law enforcement to track 
 
squared-review-and-reconcile-state-court-cases-impacted-by-landmark-scotus-decision (“The 
court concluded that Carpenter was inapplicable because the officers used the simulator to obtain 
real-time cell site location information to locate Andres and execute the warrant.”). 
 202. Andres, 254 So. 3d at 291, 297. 
 203. Id. at 297. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 298. 
 207. Id. at 297 n.7. 
 208. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2749 
(2019); see also Benson Varghese, Sims v. State: Can Police Obtain Real-Time Cell Site Location 
Without Warrant?, VARGHESE SUMMERSETT: BLOG (Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://www.versustexas.com/criminal/sims-v-state (explaining the Sims decision). 
 209. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 638. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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the defendant in real-time, and led to the defendant’s arrest and the 
discovery of key evidence.212 The defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence and argued that accessing his real-time CSLI without a 
warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.213 
The court looked to Carpenter to determine whether obtaining 
real-time CSLI records without a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment.214 It began by stating that there was no difference 
between real-time and historical CSLI records when it came to Fourth 
Amendment protection and applying Carpenter.215 In fact, the court 
hinted that real-time CSLI may be even more intrusive due to the fact 
that real-time records “are generated solely at the behest of law 
enforcement.”216 
However, the court then applied a unique test, which was 
inconsistent with Carpenter. It explained that when defining Fourth 
Amendment protection, it is not the “content,” or the “nature,” of the 
CSLI records that matters.217 Instead, it is whether the government 
seized “enough” information to violate a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.218 The court looked to “how long” law enforcement tracked a 
person.219 It explained there is “no bright-line rule for determining 
how long police must track a person’s cell phone in real time before it 
violates a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy in those records,” 
but rather, it “must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”220 
The Sims court explained that the Carpenter Court was “not 
totally clear” when it held that Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when “at least seven days” of CSLI was accessed.221 It argued that the 
Court “might have meant that accessing less than seven days of 
historical CSLI could also violate” the Fourth Amendment, or “it 
 
 212. Id. at 639. 
 213. Id. at 637. 
 214. See id. at 645. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 645 n.15. 
 217. Id. at 645–46; see also Varghese, supra note 208 (“In determining whether obtaining real-
time CSLI records violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court looked to Carpenter and determined 
that what mattered was not the content of the CSLI records, but rather was whether the government 
seized ‘enough’ information from the records that it violated a legitimate expectation to privacy.”). 
 218. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645–46. 
 219. Id. at 646. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 646 n.17. 
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might have meant that a person has [an] expectation of privacy in 
seven days or more of CSLI, but no less.”222 
Then, very abruptly, and with very little explanation, the Sims 
court concluded that the defendant “did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his physical movements or his location as 
reflected in the less than three hours of real-time CSLI records 
accessed by police by pinging his phone less than five times.”223 The 
court referred to Carpenter to explain that “longer-term surveillance 
might infringe on a person’s legitimate expectation of privacy if the 
location records reveal the ‘privacies of [his] life,’ but this [was] not 
that case.”224 
C.  Commonwealth v. Almonor 
In April 2019, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided 
Almonor, and extended warrant protections to all real-time CSLI, no 
matter the type or how long the individual was tracked.225 There, the 
defendant was a murder suspect and law enforcement warrantlessly 
pinged his cell phone in an effort to locate him.226 The pinging allowed 
law enforcement to find the defendant and the murder weapon.227 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that law 
enforcement pinging his “cell phone to reveal its real-time location 
constitute[d] a search” under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“Article 14”).228 The court 
agreed and held the pinging constituted a search under Article 14.229 
Although the defendant brought both federal and state 
constitutional claims, the court based its decision solely on Article 
14.230 However, for the purposes of this Note, the arguments and 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 646. 
 224. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018)). Going even further, 
the court noted that prior to Carpenter it held, in Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2015), that a “warrantless search of four days of historical CSLI did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at 645 n.16. The court stated this holding was “prescient” and still valid because 
Carpenter only held “police needed a warrant to access seven days of historical CSLI, which was 
three days more than in Ford.” Id. 
 225. See Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1195–96 (Mass. 2019). 
 226. Id. at 1187. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1188. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 1191 n.9 (“[A]s we conclude that a ping is a search under art. 14, ‘we have no 
need to wade into these Fourth Amendment waters.’ Instead we ‘decide the issue based on our State 
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points made by the court in support of the protection of real-time CSLI 
under Article 14 should, and could, be directly applied to Fourth 
Amendment protection.231 In fact, the lower court judge concluded 
that the ping was a search under the Fourth Amendment,232 and most 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s analysis entails looking to 
cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment.233 
The State raised two arguments in defense of its warrantless ping 
of the defendant’s phone. First, it argued that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone’s real-time 
CSLI.234 Second, citing Commonwealth v. Estabrook235—a pre-
Carpenter case—it argued CSLI could be obtained without a warrant 
as long as it was less than six hours.236 However, the court rejected 
both arguments.237 
In applying the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the 
court focused on “the nature of intrusion.”238 In particular, the court 
emphasized that pinging was “initiated and effectively controlled by 
the police, and [was] done without any express or implied 
authorization or other involvement by the individual cell phone 
user.”239 The court explained that law enforcement’s ability to obtain 
real-time CSLI was an “extraordinarily powerful surveillance tool 
[that] finds no analog in the traditional surveillance methods,” such as 
patrolling streets, interviewing individuals, and knocking on doors to 
locate persons of interest.240 For this reason, the court held that 
 
Constitution . . . .’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 
(Mass. 2014), and then quoting Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 80 N.E.3d 318 (Mass. 2017)). 
 231. See Lynch, supra note 200 (Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights “was 
drafted before—and served as one of the models for—our federal Bill of Rights. Article 14, one of 
the cornerstones of the Massachusetts Constitution, is the state’s equivalent to the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 232. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1190 (explaining that after a three-day evidentiary hearing, “the 
motion judge concluded that the ping of the defendant’s cell phone was a search under the Fourth 
Amendment”). 
 233. Id. at 1191 n.9 (explaining that the court looked to cases interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, such as Katz, Jones, and Carpenter, for “historical context and more general 
guidance”). 
 234. See id. at 1196–97. 
 235. 38 N.E.3d 231 (Mass. 2015). 
 236. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1196–97 (citing Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d at 237 (holding that law 
enforcement “may obtain historical CSLI for a period of six hours or less relating to an identified 
person’s cellular telephone from the cellular service provider without obtaining a search warrant”)). 
 237. See id. at 1193, 1997. 
 238. Id. at 1192. 
 239. Id. at 1193. 
 240. Id. at 1194–95. 
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“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement could not 
secretly and instantly identify a person’s real-time physical location at 
will,” and that “[a]llowing law enforcement to immediately locate an 
individual whose whereabouts were previously unknown by 
compelling that individual’s cell phone to reveal its location 
contravene[d] that expectation.”241 
In addition, the court noted that “[m]anipulating our phones for 
the purpose of identifying and tracking our personal location 
present[ed] an even greater intrusion”242 than “accessing the historical 
location data at issue in Carpenter.”243 This is because “cell phones 
are ‘an indispensable part of’ daily life,”244 and therefore the “ability 
to identify a cell phone’s real-time location is . . . the ability to identify 
the real-time location of its user.”245 
Additionally, the court held the “six-hour rule” from Estabrook 
only applied to historical “telephone call” CSLI, rather than real-time 
CSLI.246 The court explained that there were “fundamental 
differences” between historical “telephone call” CSLI, which is 
collected and stored by service providers when a cell phone user 
voluntarily makes or receives a telephone call, and “police action that 
causes a cell phone to identify its real-time location.”247 However, this 
analysis is flawed because historical CSLI is not only created when a 
user makes or receives a phone call. Instead, historical CSLI may be 
created even if the owner is not using the phone at all.248 
The court should have held that the six-hour rule does not apply 
to any collection of CSLI. However, besides the six-hour rule holding, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court got it right. Unlike the Supreme 
Court in Carpenter, the Massachusetts Supreme Court left no 
questions unanswered. It “confidently” held that collection of any 
CSLI—whether it comes from a service provider’s historical phone 
 
 241. Id. at 1195. 
 242. Id. at 1194. 
 243. Lynch, supra note 200. 
 244. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1194 (quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 859 
(Mass. 2014)). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1197. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al., supra note 4, at 16 
(explaining that smartphones “generate location data even in the absence of any user interaction 
with the phone”). 
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records or from technology like a cell-site simulator—intruded on a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.249 
V.  WHY REAL-TIME CSLI SHOULD BE PROTECTED 
AND WHAT TO EXPECT GOING FORWARD 
Andres and Sims are great examples of how an individual’s rights 
may be violated after the Supreme Court avoids addressing an 
important question. Hopefully, in the near future, the right case will 
reach the Supreme Court so that it can resolve this issue. However, in 
the meantime, lower courts should follow the lead of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Almonor and hold that individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time CSLI.250 
Further, the courts should hold that a warrant is required to access 
CSLI for any period of time. In addition, state legislators should take 
matters into their own hands and pass legislation prohibiting the 
collection of all CSLI without a warrant. 
Carpenter and Almonor got several things right. However, each 
had its flaws. Going forward, courts must recognize these flaws when 
addressing the protections of CSLI. Courts must acknowledge two 
main points: (1) although the Carpenter decision involved historical 
CSLI, the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court—that 
collection of historical CSLI from third-party phone companies is a 
Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant—should apply 
equally to the collection of real-time CSLI; and (2) although the 
Carpenter decision loosely held that a warrant is required only for 
collection of more than seven days of CSLI, a person’s privacy interest 
in CSLI should not be limited by time. 
A.  The Protections of Carpenter Should Apply to Real-Time CSLI 
When it comes to determining (1) whether a person has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in real-time CSLI, and (2) whether 
the third-party doctrine should apply, there is “no difference” between 
historical and real-time CSLI.251 
 
 249. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d at 1197. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 645 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 2749 (2019) (explaining that for purposes of applying the third-party doctrine and for 
determining whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his physical movements 
and location, there is “no difference” between real-time and historical CSLI). 
(10) 53.3_MOORE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2020  10:55 PM 
2020] THE IMPACT OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 739 
1.  An Individual Has a Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy in His or Her Real-Time CSLI 
The application of the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test to real-time and historical CSLI is very similar. Recall that the test 
has two prongs: first, the individual must have a subjective expectation 
of privacy; and second, the expectation must be reasonable.252 In most 
cases, the subjective expectation is easily met because courts 
recognize that “no one buys a cell phone to share detailed information” 
with law enforcement.253 Thus, the bulk of the analysis is dedicated to 
determining whether the expectation was reasonable. 
The Supreme Court in Carpenter confirmed that it is society’s 
expectation that law enforcement will not “catalogue every single 
movement” of an individual.254 The Court held that allowing law 
enforcement to access historical CSLI without a warrant 
“contravene[d] that expectation.”255 How is the warrantless collection 
of real-time CSLI any different? The answer is, it is not. “Allowing 
law enforcement to immediately locate an individual whose 
whereabouts were previously unknown,” and track his or her every 
movement “by compelling that individual’s cell phone to reveal its 
location” also “contravenes that expectation.”256 
In Carpenter, the Court emphasized that the warrantless 
collection of historical CSLI “contravenes that expectation”257 
because historical CSLI can reach beyond areas of traditional 
surveillance.258 In particular, it stated that a “cell phone faithfully 
follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private 
residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other 
potentially revealing locales.”259 This reasoning also applies to the 
 
 252. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (requiring 
“first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 253. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 643 (N.J. 2013). 
 254. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012)); see also McCubbin, supra note 168 (explaining the Carpenter decision). 
 255. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 256. Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1195 (Mass. 2019). 
 257. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 258. See id. at 2218 (“Unlike the bugged container in Knotts, or the car in Jones, a cell phone—
almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’—tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014))). 
 259. Id. 
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collection of real-time CSLI, “because it, too, allows the government 
to follow people into homes and other private spaces.”260 
2.  The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Extend 
to the Collection of Real-Time CSLI 
The Supreme Court—in Miller, Smith, and Carpenter—has made 
clear that the application of the third-party doctrine turns on two 
rationales: “the nature of the particular documents” and “voluntary 
exposure.”261 
a.  Nature of real-time CSLI collection is more intrusive 
than historical CSLI collection 
The nature of real-time CSLI collection is “not meaningfully 
different” than historical CSLI collection when it comes to applying 
the third-party doctrine.262 In fact, in most cases, the nature of real-
time CSLI collection is even more intrusive. Both historical and real-
time CSLI are records of location information which hold the 
“privacies of life.”263 They are both “all-encompassing” records which 
may reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”264 However, there is one significant difference 
that makes real-time CSLI even more invasive. Unlike historical 
CSLI, which are “business records” that are “maintained by cell phone 
service providers for business purposes, [and] are occasionally 
accessed by law enforcement, real-time CSLI records are generated 
solely at the behest of law enforcement.”265 In other words, service 
 
 260. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183 (Mass. 2019) (No. SJC-
12499), 2018 WL 4154833, at *18. 
 261. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 
(1976)) (explaining that when applying the third-party doctrine courts do “not rely solely on the act 
of sharing,” but rather, “they [also] consider[] ‘the nature of the particular documents sought’” and 
limitations on any “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents”); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741, 743–44 (1979) (explaining that in applying the third-party doctrine 
“it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged,” 
as well as stating “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (examining the “nature of the particular 
documents sought” and whether the information was “voluntarily conveyed” when applying the 
third-party doctrine). 
 262. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 645 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
2749 (2019). 
 263. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
 264. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 265. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645 n.15; see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
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providers do not collect or retain real-time CSLI. The only time it is 
collected is when law enforcement requests it.266 
b.  An individual does not voluntarily share real-time CSLI 
The Supreme Court has held that historical CSLI is not “truly 
‘shared’” with the third-party cell service providers.267 This decision 
was made even though historical CSLI may sometimes be generated 
by the affirmative action of the cell phone user, such as when the user 
makes a phone call or sends a text message.268 However, unlike 
historical CSLI, real-time CSLI is never generated by the affirmative 
action of the cell phone user.269 
As explained in Part II, there are two methods law enforcement 
use to collect real-time CSLI: pinging and cell-site simulators.270 In 
both of these methods, law enforcement affirmatively compels a cell 
phone to transmit its real-time CSLI when it would not do so on its 
own.271 In addition, when cell-site simulators are used, law 
enforcement does not need the assistance of a service provider 
whatsoever.272 The simulators allow law enforcement to “circumvent 
the service provider and gain direct access to real-time” CSLI, 
therefore taking the third-party completely out of the equation.273 
Accordingly, if the third-party doctrine does not extend to the 
collection of historical CSLI, it should not extend to the collection of 
real-time CSLI. While historical CSLI is sometimes shared with third-
party service providers through the affirmative actions of users, real-
time CSLI is never shared with a third-party service provider, and 
sometimes a third-party service provider is not even involved. 
 
 266. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Mass. 2019) (explaining 
that “[w]ithout police direction, [real-time CSLI] would also not otherwise be collected and retained 
by the service provider”). 
 267. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 268. See id. at 2212 (“While carriers have long retained CSLI for the start and end of incoming 
calls, in recent years phone companies have also collected location information from the 
transmission of text messages and routine data connections.”). 
 269. See Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645 n.15. 
 270. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2; see supra Part II. 
 271. See Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 636 n.1 (explaining that when collecting real-time CSLI, law 
enforcement officers “proactively” identify a phone’s real-time location “when the cell phone 
would not ordinarily transmit its location on its own”). 
 272. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. 
 273. Id. 
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B.  An Individual’s Privacy Interest in CSLI 
Should Not Be Limited by Time 
The Texas Criminal Appeals Court in Sims was wrong when it 
held that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test turns on 
“how long” law enforcement tracks a person.274 The collection of real-
time CSLI “for even one data point is a search” and should require a 
warrant.275 Like the courts in Carpenter and Almonor stated, the Katz 
test requires courts to analyze the nature of the particular documents, 
not just the amount of information that they reveal.276 Thus, even if 
the amount of CSLI collected only covered a short period of time, it 
would not change the analysis. This is because, “it is not . . . the length 
of the monitoring that offends the constitution but rather the place of 
the monitoring . . . that does.”277 
When law enforcement tracks an individual in real-time, it is 
doing so blindly. Law enforcement obtains an individual’s real-time 
CSLI “without knowing in advance where or [sometimes] even who 
they are.”278 This means that law enforcement may ping a cell phone 
when the individual is in a constitutionally protected place, such as the 
home. This is true regardless of whether law enforcement tracks a 
person for three hours, seven days, or several months. 
If law enforcement agencies “warrantlessly enter a private home 
to determine a defendant’s location, they cannot successfully justify 
that invasion of privacy by arguing that they stayed inside for just a 
short time.”279 With collection of real-time CSLI, the “result should 
be no different.”280 
C.  States Should Pass Legislation Prohibiting the Collection of CSLI 
Instead of waiting for the issue to make its way to the Supreme 
Court, states should take matters into their own hands and pass 
 
 274. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645–46 (explaining that “[w]hether a particular government action 
constitutes a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ does not turn on the content of the CSLI records; it turns on 
whether the government searched or seized ‘enough’ information”). 
 275. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., supra note 260, at 16. 
 276. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018); Commonwealth v. Almonor, 
120 N.E.3d 1183, 1192 n.11 (Mass. 2019). 
 277. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation & American Civil Liberties Union 
of Massachusetts, Inc. et al., supra note 260, at 15. 
 278. Id. at 19. 
 279. Id. at 14. 
 280. Id. 
(10) 53.3_MOORE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/7/2020  10:55 PM 
2020] THE IMPACT OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 743 
legislation prohibiting the collection of all CSLI without a warrant. 
Presently, nine states require a warrant to access all CSLI, four states 
prohibit real-time tracking without a warrant, and two states require a 
warrant for the use of cell-site simulators.281 However, this is not 
enough. All states that do not currently require a warrant to access all 
CSLI should look to Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy 
Act282 (“HB 57”) as a model. 
Utah’s HB 57, which was passed on March 27, 2019,283 is the 
most protective law concerning third-party-held data and represents a 
huge step in the right direction.284 It not only imposes a warrant 
requirement for all location information transmitted by an electronic 
device, it also “ensures that search engines, email providers, social 
media, cloud storage, and any other third-party ‘electronic 
communications service’ or ‘remote computing service’ are fully 
protected under the Fourth Amendment (and its equivalent in the Utah 
Constitution).”285 Thus, this law protects even “private electronic data 
stored with third parties such as Facebook, Dropbox, Twitter, or 
Google without a warrant.”286 In addition, “once agencies execute a 
warrant, they must then notify owners within 14 days that their data 
has been searched”287 and must “‘destroy in an unrecoverable manner’ 
the data it obtains ‘as soon as reasonably possible after the electronic 
information or data is collected.’”288 
 
 281. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 4. 
 282. See H.B. 57, 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019). 
 283. See Cara MacDonald, Gov. Herbert Signs Bill Requiring Police Obtain Search Warrants 
to Access Electronic Information, KSL.COM (Mar. 28, 2019, 6:28 PM), 
https://www.ksl.com/article/46520524/gov-herbert-signs-bill-requiring-police-obtain-search-
warrants-to-access-electronic-information. 
 284. See Nick Sibilla, Utah Bans Police from Searching Digital Data Without a Warrant, 
Closes Fourth Amendment Loophole, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 11:35 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/04/16/utah-bans-police-from-searching-digital-
data-without-a-warrant-closes-fourth-amendment-loophole (explaining that “Utah became the first 
state in the nation to ban warrantless searches of electronic data”). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Anna Parsons, Utah Has Stepped Up to Protect Fourth Amendment Rights Online. Will 
Your State Do the Same?, WASH. EXAMINER (June 19, 2019, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/utah-has-stepped-up-to-protect-fourth-
amendment-rights-online-will-your-state-do-the-same. 
 287. Sibilla, supra note 284. 
 288. Allison Grande, Utah Warrant Bill Raises Stakes for Cops’ Digital Data Grabs, LAW360 
(Apr. 23, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://etron.lls.edu:2195/articles/1151791/utah-warrant-bill-raises-
stakes-for-cops-digital-data-grabs. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment was implemented to protect people from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the warrantless 
collection of CSLI disregards that notion. Advances in technology 
move much faster than the law, so courts must make a concerted effort 
to keep up. Fortunately, it seems they are doing so. When it comes to 
the protection of an individual’s CSLI, “a consensus appears to be 
emerging in favor of a warrant requirement.”289 This trend is 
evidenced by judicial decisions such as Carpenter and Almonor and 
legislation such as HB 57. These actions indicate a “broader trend” 
and effort by judiciaries and legislators to “define the parameters” of 
digital protection.290 In effect, these rulings and legislation are 
chipping away at the third-party doctrine of the 1970s and making it 
clear that the law must evolve with advancing technology.291 It looks 
promising that, in the near future, all Americans will be properly 
protected against warrantless searches of their CSLI. 
 
 289. LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 29, at 2. 
 290. See Grande, supra note 288 (“This is part of a broader trend that we’re seeing in the 
legislative and judicial arenas to really sort of define the parameters of cyber investigations in terms 
of what’s available to law enforcement and under what standard.” (quoting Edward McAndrew, a 
DLA partner and former federal cybercrime prosecutor)).  
 291. See id. (“As the Supreme Court has said, digital is different, and I think this is a recognition 
of that, at least by one state.” (quoting Edward McAndrew)). 
